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TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF FAMILY BUSINESS 
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Abstract  
 
Around the world, some of the largest firms in many countries are controlled by family 
business groups such as Fiat in Italy, Ford  in the US, Hutchison Whampoa in Hong Kong, 
Samsung in South Korea and many others. Further, many family groups have a long history. 
Although family business groups are a significant and long standing phenomenon in most 
parts of the world, their resilience to globalization in their use of different governance 
structures and relational capabilities have received little attention from a cross-cultural 
perspective. Drawing on our previous work, the study provides a theoretical framework to 
classify family business groups ’key traits on the basis of their etic/emic distinction from a 
cross-cultural perspective.  
 
Keywords: etic, emic, cross-cultural perspective, family business group, family business, 
business group. 
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management, leadership in multicultural contexts. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although family business groups are a significant and long standing phenomenon in most 
parts of the world, their resilience to globalization in their use of different organizational 
structures have received little attention from a cross-cultural perspective. In particular, both 
the conceptualization of their governance structure and of their relational capability needs to 
be further explored. Existing research mainly focuses on their strategic, organizational and 
financial capabilities by devoting very limited attention to the different cultural settings in 
which family business groups operate. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical 
framework with a twofold objective: 
- First, drawing on the literature it seeks to identify and critically assess the relevant 
dimensions that can better explain the distinctive semantic traits’ that belong to the 
family business group; 
- Second, to provide a taxonomy of family business groups from a cross-cultural 
perspective by adopting GLOBE (Javidan and House, 2004; Chhokar et al., 2007) and 
by relying on the emic/etic distinction of their key traits (Pike, 1976). The underlying 
assumption is that while their etic dimensions do not vary across different cultural 
clusters, family business groups would have distinctive emic dimensions depending on 
the different cultural cluster they belong to.  
The proposed theoretical framework presents several benefits. Not only it allows a more 
holistic interpretation of the concept of family business group by simultaneously taking into 
account all the relevant dimensions, both the etic and the emic ones (Pike, 1976). Taking into 
account the work of Pinder & Moore (1979) on the taxonomizing of organizations, our 
framework will provide a fuller understanding of the phenomenon by allowing a classification 
of the family business groups’ key  traits from a cross-cultural perspective. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Family business groups and their distinctive traits 
 
Interest in the governance that characterizes family business groups is not new in the 
literature. Furthermore, family business groups are increasingly important players of the 
private sector of many emerging as well as developed markets (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, family business groups have emerged as a distinct theme in the literature and 
have thus attracted the interest of a wide range of scholars from different disciplines. In 
particular, renewed interest in this topic has recently spurred from the definition developed by 
Granovetter (1995, 2005) and tends to overcome this main shortfall by providing a richer 
insights over the existence of a particular set of ties by which governance can be exerted by 
the founding family. Similarly, when discussing family business groups, Steers et al. (1989) 
outline the importance of the strong social ties that families use in order to place their 
members in the key positions so to strengthen the power of the family. Granovetter (2005) 
and Pieper (et al., 2009) also highlight the importance of the persistence between formal and 
informal ties to ensure both the longevity and the long-term sustainability of family business 
groups.  Overall, all these accounts widely refer to the key traits that characterize the inter-
organizational relations within family business groups that are namely the “nature”, the 
“type”, the “intensity” and the “persistence” of the ties (Della Piana et al., 2010a; 2010b).  
 
2.1.1 The nature of inter-organizational relations 
 
Although many scholars have analyzed business groups characteristics (Granovetter, 1995; 
Chung, 2001; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005; Cestone et al., 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Gopalan 
et al., 2007; Hsieh, 2009; Della Piana et al. 2010b) as well as family business groups (Harvey 
et al., 1994; Aronoff et al., 1995; Ensley, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2010), there is still an 
unsolved dispute about what constitutes a family business group. Family business groups are 
often seen as a specific type of business groups possessing a set of distinctive features. The 
first trait regards the nature of inter-organizational relations; specifically we refer to the 
shareholding as “a set of legally-separate firms with stable relationships operating in multiple 
strategically unrelated activities and under common ownership and control” (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006: 420). In this sense the business groups is identified as a type of firm network, 
characterized by a multiple set of stable relationships on the basis of a common ownership 
(Della Piana and Cacia, 2009). Accordingly, if we analyze business groups based on their 
ownership we can identify three different types: family-owned, widely-held, and state-owned 
as illustrated in the Table1.  
These types of business groups have different actors who own, control and manage them so 
this results in different agency costs, different levels of diversification and performance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). In this context, family-owned business groups are a particular type 
of business groups often characterised by large shareholdings that enable and provide 
incentives for the family to exert strict control over management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Family business groups also do not suffer from agency problems of separation of ownership 
and control as do other types of business groups (Claessens et al., 2000). Besides, using 
family members and trusted intermediaries as managers solves the agency costs of managerial 
misbehaviour thanks to the social control provided by the family relationships (Davis, 1983). 
These circumstances allow family-owned business groups to generate superior performance 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Maury, 2006).  
 Table 1 - Business Groups Taxonomy (Source: Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) 
  family-owned widely-held state-owned 
Ownership individual or family dispersed among many 
shareholders - no controlling stake  
citizens -  firms are officially 
owned by the government 
/national/sub-national /local 
level 
Control individual or family Managers - no distinct majority  Politicians  
Management individual or family Professionals Professionals 
Separation 
of the roles 
No Managers are appointed by the 
board, which in many cases is 
controlled by the managers 
The politicians and civil servants 
manage the firm either directly 
or indirectly, through the control 
of appointed managers.  
Professional 
managers 
under close control by 
the family 
control decision-making control decision-making 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show that family-controlled firms often use 
pyramidal ownership structures to exert control over a large network of firms. The family 
achieves control and exerts governance over the entire business group by establishing a chain 
of ownership relationships: the family directly controls a firm, which in turn controls another 
firm, which might itself control another firm, and so forth (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).   
 
2.1.2 The type of inter-organizational relations 
 
The classification from the standpoint of ownership in itself does not highlight the features 
and the role of different types of inter-organizational relations. In particular, Granovetter 
(2005: 429) highlights the importance of relationships types, describing them as “persistent 
formal and/or informal ways” in which the ties are established between firms, that are 
established through equity alliances and interlocking directorships. He further argues that “the 
level of binding is intermediate between … two extremes that are not business groups: sets of 
firms linked merely by short-term strategic alliances, and those legally consolidated into a 
single entity”. In line with Khanna and Rivhin (2006), we argue that as products of social 
construction, family business groups most likely cannot be reduced to the distinctive presence 
of specific types of ties between firms such as equity holdings, family bonds, or interlocking 
directorships. Nonetheless, inter-firm ties play a significant role in the family business 
governance and scholars have consistently identified groups due to the presence of particular 
types of ties (Khanna and Rivhin, 2006). For instance, research shows that family businesses 
can rely on networks and long-term relationships that might foster trust and altruism (Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Pieper, 2007; Astrachan, 2010) and frequently have a long-
term perspective (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; Pieper, 2007).  
 
2.1.3 The intensity of inter-organizational relations 
 
While scholars have extensively debated about the nature of inter-organizational relationships 
as well as about the types of inter-organizational relationships, surprisingly very limited 
attention has been devoted to the interplay between these two traits and in particular to their 
coexistence. By adopting a family embeddedness perspective, research has extensively 
highlighted the importance of the simultaneous presence of shareholdings (formal ties) and 
personal ties (informal ties) (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Granovetter, 1995, 2005; Mahmood 
et al., 2011).  In particular, several authors point out that business groups are characterized by 
particular types of ties (Khanna and Rivhin, 2006; Pieper, 2007; Astrachan, 2010) and these 
mostly entail equity alliances and interlocking directorships (Granovetter, 2005). Indeed, the 
mere existence of interlocking directorships in itself does not share any light over the features 
and the role of different types of relationships and the way in which these ties might be 
valuable for the governance of the family business group. Other researchers (Ben-Porath, 
1980; Pollak, 1985; Aronoff and Ward, 1995; Harvey, 1999) refer to these ties as implicit ties 
that are often an effective substitute for the relatively more formalized, explicit, contractual 
relationships. This is particularly visible in the family system, where the key features that 
influence the firms’ operations are the pre-existing, implicit and social ties among family 
members and often the family system, thanks to the presence of trust, no longer needs 
hierarchical control (Powell, 1990; Ring and Ven de Ven, 1992; Ernst and Bleeke, 1993; 
Barney and Hansen, 1994; Holm, Eriksson and Johanson, 1999; Schulze, 2003; Gulati, 2005; 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Ferrin and Dirks, 2003; Lubatkin, 2005). In this context, 
family relationships can provide competitive advantage in addition to firms’ specific 
resources. Family can add and shed resources to the business in various ways, through 
financial, labour, intellectual, cultural and trust capital by facilitating the decision-making 
process, thereby providing family businesses with an edge over its competitors (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2009; Astrakhan, 2010).  
 
2.1.4 The persistence of a specific set of inter-organizational relations 
 
Although the nature, type and intensity stresses the importance of “family bonds” and “family 
bridges” between the family and its business in creating unique resources and wealth, we 
believe that  to capture the goal of the family business group, which is maximizing the 
interests of the founding members across generations and the long-term profitability of the 
group as a whole, is necessary to assess the persistence of the specific set of inter-
organizational relationships.. Though there are many examples of long-lived family 
businesses, their sources of longevity are not well understood (Astrachan, 2010).  There are 
many factors that complicate the task of assuring long-term survival to family businesses. As 
family and business grow older and larger over time, family ties often ebb making norms, 
obligations and informal control more difficult to maintain. For example, as ownership 
disperses, control over the business becomes harder to be exerted (Astrachan, 2010). Apart 
from business vitality, research shows that persistent family values are crucial for maintaining 
family ownership in the long run (Pieper, 2007). Memili and colleagues (2011) highlight that 
in family businesses the entrepreneurial behaviour is related to growth and the number of 
generations the family has been in business. For example, they further argue that amongst 
publicly listed family companies, family ownership is inversely related to acquisitions. Other 
empirical evidence shows that entrenched CEOs, especially those with long tenures, have a 
constraining effect on growth, whereas entrepreneurship and growth are promoted by families 
that are involved in business oversight and management (Zahra, 2005). Similarly, Claver and 
colleagues (Claver et al., 2009) find that a long-term orientation and non-family management 
are positively related to international growth.  
 
2.2. Family business groups from a cross-cultural perspective 
 
Although there is a quite established consensus about the existence of the distinctive traits that 
characterize family business groups, namely the nature, the type, the intensity and the 
persistence of inter-organizational relations we tend to lack a fuller appreciation on how 
governance structures and relational capabilities are likely to differ across different cultural 
settings. To fill this gap, the theoretical framework underpinning our research relies on 
GLOBE (Javidan and House, 2004; Chhokar et al., 2007)  and on the etic/emic distinction 
introduce introduced by Pike (1976). 
 
2.2.1. Globe 
 
For the purpose of our research we adopt GLOBE (Javidan and House, 2004; Chhokar et al., 
2007). GLOBE’s intent is to explore the cultural values and practices in a wide variety of 
countries and to identify their impact on organisational practices and leadership attributes. To 
this end, House et al., (2004) examine national cultures in terms of nine dimensions: 
1. Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as the extent to which members of a society 
strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals and bureaucratic 
practices to mitigate the unpredictability of future events. 
2. Power Distance is defined as the degree to which members of society expect 
and agree that power should be equally shared. 
3. Institutional Collectivism reflects the degree to which societal practices 
encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective 
action. 
4. In-Group Collectivism reflects the degree to which individuals express pride, 
loyalty and cohesiveness in their organisations. 
5. Gender Egalitarianism is the extent to which a society minimises gender role 
differences and gender discrimination. 
6. Assertiveness is the degree to which individuals in societies are assertive, 
confrontational and aggressive in their social relationships. 
7. Future Orientation is the degree to which individuals in societies engage in 
future-oriented behaviours such as planning, investing in the future, and 
delaying gratification. 
8. Performance Orientation refers to the extent to which a society encourages 
and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence. 
9. Humane Orientation is the degree to which individuals in organisations or 
societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, 
generous, caring and kind to others.   
On the basis of the nine cultural dimensions listed above, the GLOBE study identifies ten 
societal clusters: South Asia, Anglo, Arab, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Confucian Asia, Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa and Nordic Europe. National 
culture provides a fruitful area for research in family business groups1.  We argue that 
                                                 
1 There is a substantial body of literature available about national culture but there is very little that adopts a 
holistic approach to assess its effects on the governance of family business groups. While existing research 
extending this line of enquiry family business groups holds great potential to gain a fuller 
insight on whether they are managed differently across different national cultures. In 
particular, the paper attempts to provide a fuller appreciation of family business group’s 
governance and relational capabilities.  
 
2.2.2. Etic vs Emic 
 
Following a thorough review of the relevant literature on family firms (Sharma, 2004; 
Astrachan, 2010; Cruz et al., 2012; Pittino and Visintin, 2010; Memili et al., 2011) and 
business groups (Leff, 1978; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Morck and Nakamura, 1999; 
Chung, 2001; Friedman et al., 2003; Khama and Yafeh, 2005;  Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005; 
Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Gopalan et al., 2007) we endorse the idea that the key traits of 
family business groups (nature, type, intensity and persistence) are likely to vary across 
different cultural settings. Recently, several contributions explore economic action within a 
wide variety of organizing contexts in which family businesses are embedded. In particular, 
two related issues find widespread acknowledgement: the importance of the broader social 
context in affecting economic behavior, and the wide variety of organizational contexts in 
which this occurs (Granovetter, 1985; Rao et al., 2000; Steier, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). In line with 
this work, Aldrich and Cliff (2003), Steier (2001), Steier et al., (2009: 1158) share the view 
by which “family firms and their family stakeholders are usefully viewed as embedded in 
social relationships”. Through their work, firstly they illustrate that family actors are 
embedded in multiple social systems, and that the nature of embeddedness has economic 
implications. 
Although there is wide consensus that the organizational context is crucial to fully understand 
family business groups very few studies devote attention to their cultural context. Veliyath’ 
study (et al., 2000) for instance investigates the CEO's social embeddedness and overt and 
covert power as determinants of CEO pay in a sample of Indian family-controlled firms. From 
the findings it emerges that family shareholding and the percentage of inside directors on the 
board are found to be the predominant influences on CEO pay. Similarly, a very recent study 
conducted by Masulis et. al., (2011) using a dataset of 28,635 firms in 45 countries, 
investigate the motivations for family-controlled business groups. They provide evidence 
consistent with the argument that particular group structures emerge not only to perpetuate 
                                                                                                                                                        
mainly adopts Hofstede's dimensions of national culture, GLOBE captures more comprehensively and less 
ambiguously the elements of national culture as illustrated in Table 2 in the Appendix. 
control, but also to alleviate financing constraints at the country and firm levels. At the 
country level, family groups, especially those structured as pyramids, are more prevalent in 
markets with limited availability of capital. Bertand et al., (2008) analyze how the structure of 
the Thai families behind these business groups affects the groups' organization, governance 
and performance. Interestingly, groups that are run by larger families (more male siblings of 
the group head) tend to have lower performance.  
Overall this evidence in terms of governance structures and relational capabilities of family 
business groups embedded in very different cultural settings leads us to assume that their key 
traits are also likely to vary accordingly. In order to produce an useful taxonomy of family 
business groups and their key traits, the emic/etic distinction as it has been introduced by Pike 
seems particularly valuable. Emic refers to” logical-empirical systems whose phenomenal 
distinctions or "things" are built up out of contrasts and discriminations significant, 
meaningful, real, accurate, or in some other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors 
themselves “ (Pike, 1976: 571). Etic depends upon “phenomenal distinctions judged 
appropriate by the community of scientific observers “ (Pike, 1976: 575).  For the purpose of 
the research the framework is therefore useful to identify those key traits of family business 
groups that do not tend to vary across different cultural settings  (the etic dimensions that 
characterize family business groups) from those that are likely to vary (the emic ones). 
 
 
3. A Cross-Cultural Framework 
 
Figure 1 below provides a graphical representation of our cross-cultural framework. 
 
Figure 1 – A cross-cultural framework of FBG’ key traits based on etic/emic distinction . 
3.1. Proposition 
 
Drawing on sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, we attempt to test the following propositions. 
1) Family business groups belonging to different cultural clusters are likely to display similar  
governance structures thus the nature of their inter-organizational relations is likely to be 
an etic dimension. 
2) Family business groups belonging to different cultural clusters are likely to display 
different  relational capabilities thus their type (both formal and informal ties), their 
intensity and their persistence are likely to be  emic dimensions. More specific 
propositions could be further developed, such as: 
i) Family business groups tend to rely more extensively on formal ties on those 
clusters that score high in power distance. 
ii) Family business groups tend to rely more extensively on formal ties on those 
clusters that score high in institutional collectivism.  
iii) Family business groups tend to rely more extensively on informal ties on those 
clusters that score low in power distance. 
iv) Family business groups tend to rely more extensively on informal ties on those 
clusters that score low in in-group collectivism. 
v) Intensity between formal ties and informal ties is likely to be greater for those 
family business groups in clusters scoring high in uncertainty avoidance. 
vi) Persistence is likely to be grater for those family business groups in clusters 
scoring high in long term orientation. 
 
3.2. Research design 
 
This research is exploratory and its aim is to introduce a theoretical framework on the basis of 
which we can more accurately depict the family business groups’ key traits from a cross-
cultural perspective. “Case studies represent a methodology that is ideally suited to creating 
managerially relevant knowledge” (Gibbert et al., 2008) and they are considered most 
appropriate as tools in the critical, early phases of a new management theory, when key 
variables and their relationships are being explored (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore 
case study research is particularly useful at the early stages of theory development, in which 
key themes and categories have yet to be empirically isolated (Eisenhardt, 1989; Elg and 
Johansson, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Yin, 1984). In particular multiple case studies provide a more 
solid basis for generalization and can provide substantial opportunities for theory-building 
(Steier and Miller, 2010). For the purpose of the research 10 explorative case-studies 
belonging to the 10 GLOBE clusters will be selected drawing from a variety of different 
sectors. According to Kerlinger and Lee (2000: 586), “exploratory studies have three 
purposes: discovering significant variables in the field situation, discovering relationships 
among variables, and laying the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing 
of hypotheses”. Since the purpose of the research is to develop an analytical framework which 
will require further testing, the selection of multiple case studies was deemed as appropriate. 
As highlighted in the work of Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung (2011), qualitative methods can 
take us beyond Hofstede (1980) and GLOBE (Tung & Verbeke, 2010) to generate other 
interpretations of culture that will enable us to make sense of complex FBG phenomena. 
Finally, as for the reliability of the research (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010; Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994), data collection and data analysis will replicate previous work (Della Piana, et al. 
2010a, 2010b). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 2: Correspondence between Hofstede and GLOBE 
 Hofstede's dimensions of national culture 
GLOBE's dimensions 
of national culture 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Power 
Distance 
Collectivism Masculinity 
Uncertainty Avoidance √    
Power Distance  √   
Institutional Collectivism   √  
In-Group Collectivism   ~  
Gender Egalitarianism    ~ 
Assertiveness    ~ 
Future Orientation     
Performance Orientation     
Humane Orientation     
(Source: Hofstede, 2006)  √=direct correspondence,  ~ = weak similarity 
Hofstede (2006) has discussed the equivalence between his dimensions of national culture and 
those of GLOBE. While there is direct correspondence for uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance and collectivism (with institutional collectivism) the remaining six GLOBE 
dimensions are not found to have a direct correspondence among Hofstede’s four dimensions. 
For example, Hofstede's masculinity is split into assertiveness and gender egalitarianism in 
GLOBE. 
